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Concentrated Ownership and Corporate 






Samsung Group’s success cannot be attributed to its corporate governance structure, at 
least thus far. The corporate governance of Samsung has been rather controversial. As the group 
faces the succession issue the corporate governance has become as crucial as their new products 
and services. Samsung has discovered a role model on the other side of the planet, Wallenberg 
Sphere in Sweden. Much effort has been made to learn about Wallenberg’s arrangements and key 
to its success. However, a fundamental difference between the institutions in Sweden and Korea 
has made the corporate structures of the two groups radically different. Wallenberg uses the dual-
class commons whereas Samsung relies upon the circular shareholdings through affiliated firms. 
This Essay explains and analyzes the two different institutions and corporate structures, and 
argues that the introduction of the dual-class commons in Korea would make the corporate 
governance of Samsung more transparent and efficient, if and only if accompanied by Samsung’s 
commitment to socially responsible corporate citizenship. This Essay also explains and analyzes 
the recent developments in corporate governance of non-banking financial institutions in Korea 
and looks into the issue from the perspective of Samsung’s structure in comparison with 
Wallenberg’s structure.   
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Wallenberg Sphere of Sweden and Samsung Group of Korea share 
many things in common. Both are the flagship business conglomerates in their 
respective countries, significantly contributing to each nation’s GDP.1 Both of 
them exercise substantial influence on the politics and society in their countries 
                                                 
* Professor of Law at Seoul National University, and William W. Cook Global Law 
Professor at the University of Michigan Law School.  
1 Samsung Group’s some 60 companies, including Samsung Electronics and Samsung Life 
Insurance, accounted for 13% of Korea’s GDP in 2011. See Mighty Samsung Weighs Heavy on S 
Korea, Financial Times, Nov. 14, 2012. The Wallenbergs owned some 40% of the value of the 
listed companies in Sweden by the late 1990s. See The Wallenbergs: Sweden's enduring business 
dynasty, The Economist, Oct. 12, 2006. 
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due to the sheer volume of their production capabilities and number of employees, 
suppliers and customers. 
From the perspective of corporate governance, they are controlled by the 
members of a family through concentrated ownership and other legal and practical 
arrangements.2 For that reason, along with the economic power concentration 
concern, Wallenberg used to be, and Samsung has been highly controversial for 
many years. And perhaps for that reason again, the two groups of companies and 
their people in charge remain close to each other,3 having developed some sort of 
moral alliance and personal friendships. Given that Korea and Sweden historically 
were not closely related to each other, it is remarkable that Wallenberg’s name has 
become quite recognizable in the Korean industry circle, and Samsung is 
responsible for it. 
This Essay will explain and briefly analyze the corporate governance 
issues in the two groups from the perspective of comparative corporate law, 
practice, and finance. As a matter of fact, it is not a secret that Samsung regards 
Wallenberg as its model in corporate governance, control, and citizenship. In 
particular, Samsung is interested in learning the way Wallenberg managed the 
corporate social responsibility issue and family control succession problem. One 
of the keys to understanding Wallenberg’s “secret of success” lies in Sweden’s 
corporate governance institutions which currently are not available to Samsung as 
a Korean corporate group. This Essay will focus on those differences and propose 
some institutional and practical changes to Samsung as well as the Korean 
government. 
II.  THE WALLENBERG MODEL4 
A. Corporate Structure 
                                                 
2 Concentrated ownership has been the hallmark of Asian and European firms. See Randall 
K. Morck ed., Concentrated Corporate Ownership (2000). But, current scholarship shows us that 
even in the United States the ownership of large firms is now highly concentrated, not with 
families but with institutional investors. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency 
Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 
Columbia Law Review 863 (2013); Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the 
United States, 22 Review of Financial Studies 1377 (2007). 
3 See Powerful Swedish Family Arrives in Korea for Conference, The Dong-A Ilbo, March 
18, 2012. 
4 For Wallenberg and Swedish economy in general, see Lennart Schön, An Economic 
History of Modern Sweden (2012). 
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The Swedish model of corporate governance gained much attention ever 
since the comparative corporate governance scholarship was born in the United 
States.5 Ronald Gilson is well known to be a big fan of the Swedish model. 
Gilson designated the Swedish model as an “efficient controlling shareholder 
system” 6, based obviously on the conventional wisdom that the controlling 
(minority) shareholder system7 was not efficient. 
The hallmark of the Wallenberg corporate structure is its family control 
over the entire group of companies, including such giants as Ericsson, Scania and 
ABB, through the dual-class commons owned by Investor, the main company. 
Investor, in turn, is owned by the Wallenberg Foundations at 22% in equity and 
46% in votes. Gilson even calls the dual-class commons structure as the “Swedish 
capital structure.” In the Swedish capital structure “the founders retained stock 
with many times the voting power of the class of common stock sold to the 
public.”8 The Wallenberg family has maintained control over the group through 
an arrangement that creates huge discrepancy between their cash flow right and 
control right. Such a discrepancy typically is characterized as a sign of bad 
corporate governance by most scholarly opinions.9 However, the Wallenberg 
structure is an exception and accepted by the Swedish society largely due to 
Wallenberg’s social commitments and lack of self-dealing and family members’ 
entrenchment. The Wallenberg family controls and runs the businesses, but it does 
not “own” the franchise. No private benefit of control is known to be enjoyed by 
the family. 
B. Corporate Citizenship 
Much has been written about Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish version of 
Oskar Schindler, who rescued tens of thousands Jews in Nazi-occupied Hungary 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian 
Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 Stanford Law 
Review 985 (1993). See also Peter Högfeldt, The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in 
Sweden, in: Randall K. Morck ed., A History of Corporate Governance Around the World: Family 
Business Groups to Professional Managers 517 (2005). 
6  See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: 
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 Harvard Law Review 1641 (2006).  
7 For CMS (Controlling Minority Structure), see Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, 
Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity, in Concentrated Corporate Ownership, supra note __, at 
295.  
8 See Gilson, supra note 6 at 1660.  
9 See, e.g., Stijn Claessens et al., The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian 
Corporations, 58 Journal of Financial Economics 81 (2000). 
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during the later stages of the Second World War.10 The story fits very well with 
the Wallenberg’s image of a conglomerate that has consistently tried to resonate 
with the Swedish society as a socially responsible corporate citizen. The 
Wallenberg Foundations also extensively support scientific research, higher 
education and the arts in Sweden. 
The Wallenberg concentrates on such major businesses as Aerospace, 
Machinery and Telecommunications, leaving other areas of business to small 
enterprises.11 It also recognizes the labor union as partner, not party on the other 
side of the table representing the conflicting interest. This goes back to the tri-
party Saltsjöbaden Agreement that was signed by Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation (Landsorganisationen: LO) and Swedish Employers’ Confede-
ration (Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen: SAF) on December 20, 1938 under the 
auspices of the government. Instead of nationalizing business groups’ assets, the 
Swedish government and labor unions recognized the business groups’ vested 
interests. Through the arrangement, they could keep the big businesses in Swedish 
territory, and gain their support for further social reform. Employers, in return, did 
agree to take higher corporate tax burden. This industrial relations regime did 
survive the far-reaching labor legislation around 1970, and remained effective 
until superseded by the Industrial Agreement of 1997, the new labor market 
regime in Sweden.12 
III.  THE SAMSUNG ISSUE IN KOREA 
Corporate governance in Korea has “again” become a hot political and 
social issue. The Korean economy has long been dominated by Chaebols,13 large 
corporate conglomerates, including Samsung Group, throughout its past. 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Kati Marton, Wallenberg: The Incredible True Story of the Man Who Saved 
the Jews of Budapest (2011); Alex Kershaw, The Envoy: The Epic Rescue of the Last Jews of 
Europe in the Desperate Closing Months of World War II (2010).  
11 In Korea, big business groups expanded into small areas such as bakeries, restaurants 
and grocery stores. The problem is that those businesses are regularly run by children or relatives 
of controlling-shareholder managers of the business groups. This created outrage in the public 
opinion and led to the establishment of the National Commission for Corporate Partnership in 
2010 under the Law for Promotion of Coexistence and Partnership between Big and Small and 
Medium Size Enterprises. 
12 See Nils Elvander, Two Labour Market Regimes in Sweden: A Comparison Between the 
Saltsjöbaden Agreement of 1938 and the Industrial Agreement of 1997, 10 Industrielle 
Beziehungen 146 (2003). 
13 See Jeong Seo, Who Will Control Frankenstein? The Korean Chaebol’s Corporate 
Governance, 14 Cardozo Journal of International & Comparative Law 21 (2006); Myung Hun 
Kang, The Korean Business Conglomerate: Chaebol Then and Now (1996).  
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Although corporate governance of Korean firms in general has significantly 
improved over time, the concentration of economic and even political powers on 
Chaebols have become more intense. 14  Samsung stands in the middle of 
controversy. Although Samsung Group is a private business entity comprised of 
public and private companies, the public, the media and politicians closely follow 
its governance because it has heavy impacts on the markets and the nation’s 
economy.15 Ever since the 2008 global financial crisis, antagonism amongst 
general population against Chaebols in general16 and Samsung in particular has 
grown significantly, while some corporate scandals and political campaigns did 
contribute to the trend. 
A.    Succession Problem 
The controlling shareholder-managers of many Chaebols face the 
succession problem, with some of them committing questionable acts in the 
succession process causing big scandals and ending up standing before law 
enforcement agencies and courts.17 
The best way to understand Samsung’s issues is probably looking into its 
succession problem. It all starts with Cheil Industries (formerly Samsung 
Everland), a theme park housing lots of zoo animals like lions and tigers. 
Everland practically functions as the holding company of the Samsung Group. It 
controls Samsung Life Insurance, and in turn, the insurance giant controls 
Samsung Electronics, the flagship of the group. According to the Financial Times, 
as of December 2013 Samsung Electronics was the world’s thirteenth largest 
company right after Johnson & Johnson and followed by China Mobile.  
Until recently, Cheil remained as a private firm owned largely by 
members of the Lee family.18 Cheil is the Samsung version of Wallenberg’s 
                                                 
14 See Corporate Kingpins Living on Borrowed Time, Korea JoongAng Daily, Dec. 7, 2012 
(reporting that a total of 30 largest conglomerates accounted for 95% of GDP in 2011). 
15 Cf. Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 137 (2011) (discussing increased “publicness” and the role of government in corporate 
governance of large public companies). 
16 See, e.g., Simon Munday, South Korean Companies: Needed on the Home Front, 
Financial Times, Nov. 18, 2003. 
17 See Hwa-Jin Kim, Seung-Hwan Lee & Stephen Woodcock, Favoritism and Corporate 
Law: The Confused Corporate Opportunity Doctrine in the Hyundai Motor Case, 3 Michigan 
Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law 41 (2013).  
18 The average ownership of the controlling shareholders of non-public member firms of 
Samsung Group was 78.43%, whereas their cash-flow rights were as low as 19.43%. For public 
member firms the number was 13.52% and 1.14%, respectively. See James Jinho Chang & Hyun-
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Investor. So, if control over Cheil gets passed on, the control over the whole group 
passes on. The question is to whom. Samsung’s Chairman Lee has three children, 
a son and two daughters. They hold controlling shares in Cheil and some shares in 
other affiliate companies of the group. In 1996, an important decision was made. 
Where Cheil (Everland) offered a substantial amount of convertible bonds to the 
shareholders with preemptive rights. Almost all of the shareholders turned down 
the offer. Everland then “found” willing buyers from outside, Lee’s children. The 
son got the lion’s share and became the new largest shareholder in Everland. It 
seemed as if control over the group had been smoothly passed on to the son. 
However, the story had a surprising twist. 
Five years after the transaction, 43 law professors brought criminal 
charges against the Everland managers. They thought that the price of convertible 
bonds was too low, resulting in a very cheap transfer of corporate control to the 
son to the detriment of the company’s financials. After years of a lengthy and 
painful courtroom debacle, the Korean Supreme Court ultimately decided, by a 
five to four judgment, that the defendants were not guilty.19 The Supreme Court’s 
judgment made the son’s control over Everland legitimate, but the control and 
succession issue has not been solved yet. 
The ultimate trouble is that the whole corporate structure of the Samsung 
Group has been built on the roundabout circular shareholding. Samsung Life 
controls Samsung Electronics, which controls Samsung Card, and Samsung Card 
in turn holds a sizable share in Samsung Life.20 It is now too big an entity for a 
family to maintain effective control without such an arrangement. It is almost like 
the Lee family controls the entire group through other people’s money. On top of 
that, as Chairman Lee gets older, his two ambitious daughters may require their 
fair shares in the group. Also, they will have to pay inheritance taxes through 
selling the shares. To make the matter more difficult, two financial institutions, 
Samsung Life and Samsung Card, are involved in the structure, which invites 
political interference and, accordingly, makes the whole issue more difficult to 
solve. 
                                                                                                                                     
Han Shin, Family Ownership and Performance in Korean Conglomerates, 15 Pacific-Basin 
Finance Journal 329 (2007). 
19 Supreme Court Judgment of May 29, 2009, 2005-No-2371: The entire judgment is 
available in Hwa-Jin Kim, Corporate Finance and Governance 462-482 (2nd ed., 2012) (Korean).  
20 This structure comes up in the United States, too. See Speiser v. Baker, 525 A.2d 1001 
(Del. Ch. 1987). In Germany, they call it “Ringförmige Mehrheitsbeteiligungen.” See Friedrich 
Kübler, Gesellschaftsrecht 362 (5th ed. 1998) (suggesting potential liability of directors who 
created the structure). 
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B.    Social Responsibility 
From the perspective of stakeholder capitalism,21 Samsung’s track record 
does not look that impressive. The most notable example is Samsung’s decades 
long policy against labor unions. Also, its history has been tainted with such 
scandals as tax evasions and corrupt practices.22 Chairman Lee once stepped 
down from his office when the former general counsel of the group spoke out 
after the former public prosecutor met with some Catholic priests. A special 
prosecutor was appointed by the parliament, found some wrongdoings and 
indicted Lee. Samsung was forced to pledge for socially responsible management 
and committed a significant amount of funds for that purpose. This is the point 
where Samsung became eager to learn from Wallenberg’s experiences.  
The Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance23 adopted by the 
Korean Committee on Corporate Governance in September 1999 declares that 
“[t]he corporation shall not be negligent in its social responsibilities, such as 
consumer protection and environmental protection.”24 Actually, the notion that 
corporations are socially responsible was already widespread and well accepted 
under the authoritarian military governments from the 1960s through the 1980s. 
This notion is also related to the popular concept that socially responsible and 
“patriotic” business managers greatly contribute to the economic development of 
their “fatherland”.  
Socially responsible companies have been popular in Korea along the 
way. For instance, pharmaceutical companies act and present themselves almost 
like charitable institutions. Big companies build hospitals, museums and schools 
                                                 
21 See generally, Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial 
Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 Harvard 
International Law Journal 129 (2009); Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth (2012).  
22 The family has also been involved in an inheritance dispute. See Court Sides with 
Samsung Electronics Chairman in Family Feud, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 1, 2013; Feud Among 
Samsung Descendants Heats Up, New York Times, Nov. 14, 2012.  
23 Committee on Corporate Governance, Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance 
(September 1999).  
24 Section IV-1.3. (“With the significant rise of corporation’s influence on the economy 
and society, similarly increasing has been the recognition of general public’s concern about 
corporation’s social responsibilities. Also, consumers and regional societies have been increasing 
in importance as interested parties in the continuance of the corporation. In particular, if the 
corporation neglects its social responsibilities, such as protecting consumer rights or the 
environment using its vantage, it will, unlike the past, lead to a very adverse effect on its long-term 
development as well as to a decline in its image. Therefore, each corporation shall enable its 









and establish endowments.25 Samsung also runs one of the finest hospitals in 
Korea. Cheil, together with Samsung Life, has a guide dogs program with many 
Labrador Retrievers. Whenever a national disaster occurs, the media 
enthusiastically reports on contributions made by the companies with references 
to the amounts contributed, sometimes ranked by size. The websites of major 
corporations in Korea, including those of Samsung and LG, very proudly 
introduce how they value the concept of corporate social responsibility and that 
their performance has been in line with such a concept.  
On the other hand, there were and are many controlling shareholder-
managers in Korea who voluntarily assume unlimited responsibility for their 
companies. They take the financial responsibility of their firms on themselves by 
issuing guarantees for the firms’ debt, and by other methods, voluntarily giving up 
the benefit of the limited liability principle as they put their personal properties 
into the corporation when the firm is in trouble to save the firm and employees’ 
jobs and even compensate for losses incurred by the firm’s customers. This would 
be surprising if it were to happen in a Fortune 500 International public firm.26  
However, most legal scholars in Korea are skeptical about bringing the 
concept of corporate social responsibility into a statute. 27  Corporate social 
responsibility, however good it may be, may become a simple “guidance” that 
does not help judges. It is argued that it is not clear who is the legal beneficiary of 
the directors’ obligation to act in a socially responsible way. Also, such a law may 
be abused under sensitive and unstable political circumstances. Management 
might use the concept to sacrifice shareholder interests.28 Korean corporate law 
as it stands today does not provide the non-shareholder stakeholders of a 
corporation with any kind of legal right as far as corporate governance is 
                                                 
25 Like Wallenbergs did, some of the endowments and foundations were used to place part 
of a controlling block of shares in friendly hands. Such a practice was also popular because it 
could mitigate the inheritance tax burden without diluting control. The Korean government took 
some measures to curb the practice in 1997 through a tax law reform. 
26 Also, Korean banks usually require the controlling-shareholder managers and other key 
officers to issue personal guarantees for a firm’s debts. The Korean banking practice heavily relies 
upon secured lending. If the firm fails, the controlling-shareholder manager loses everything, 
unless he or she runs some kind of safety funds. 
27 See, e.g., Chul Song Lee, Corporate Law 66 -67 (20th ed., 2012) (Korean). 
28 In Japan, the House of Representatives resolved twice (in 1973 and 1981) to require the 
government to codify the concept, but nothing happened. Id. at 66. 
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concerned. Non-shareholder stakeholders can only protect their legitimate 
interests through contract, tax and labor law.29  
Korea is currently also under the strong influence of the paradigm change 
that took place after the global financial crisis and ‘Occupy Wall Street’ campaign. 
In the presidential election of 2012, all candidates promised to do something 
about the current model of economy. The discussion of corporate social 
responsibility has regained the focus in the context of ‘economic democracy.’ As 
the biggest business entity in Korea, Samsung is under pressure and should come 
up with a new idea and policy that may satisfactorily answer the requirements 
newly made by Korean society. 
C. The Case for Dual-Class Commons 
The dual-class common stock structure, or the “Swedish capital structure” 
as Gilson puts it, is popular in Europe30 but it is also widely used in the United 
States31 in the big public companies as well as venture capital-backed companies 
undergoing IPOs.32 The most well-known example of the concentrated ownership 
with the dual-class structure in the U.S. is Berkshire Hathaway, one of the most 
profitable and respected firms in the world.33 The difference between Berkshire, 
Wallenberg and Samsung is that Berkshire is under the control of individual 
                                                 
29 See Section IV-1.2 of the Code: “The corporation shall make every effort to maintain 
and improve labor conditions by faithfully observing labor-related statutes such as the Labor 
Standard Act.” See also Section IV-2.1 of the Code: “The form and level of management 
monitoring by creditors shall be determined through discussion among the related parties, 
according to the corporation’s distinctive qualities.” The Korean Act on Worker Participation and 
Promotion of Cooperation is basically a labor law statute that enforces convening of labor-
management consultative meetings, during which employers are required to report and explain the 
business plans/strategies, matters concerning their implementation, quarterly production plans and 
performances, personnel plans, and the corporation’s financial status. So, it cannot be compared 
with the German co-determination. 
30 Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union (18 May 2007). 
31 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of 
Shareholder Choice, 76 California Law Review 1 (1988). 
32 See, e.g., Laura Field & Jonathan Karpoff, Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms, 57 Journal 
of Finance 1857 (2002).  
33 By conventional standards, the corporate governance of Berkshire cannot be positively 
evaluated. The gap between cash flow right and control right is big. Its aging board does not look 
that independent, etc. Perhaps, the firm represents the extremely rare benevolent dictatorship 
model that makes all discussions trivial. 
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managers led by Warren Buffett,34 not families. The enterprise has neither been 
inherited nor faces the bloodline succession problem. 
The dual-class structure is regarded as an antitakeover arrangement,35 but 
that is not all that it does. The dual class share system is relatively more 
transparent compared to cross-shareholdings or pyramid type structures.36 If the 
dual-class stock system is abolished, the relevant companies will restructure the 
corporate governance through adopting cross-shareholding or creating a pyramid 
to protect its incumbent manager’s vested interests.37  
One of the reasons that the Korean Chaebols use complicated 
shareholding structures is a legal one. The KCC does not allow firms to issue 
dual-class common stocks. The one-share-one-vote rule in the KCC38 has been 
regarded as mandatory and, may not be opted out through charter provisions. 
Large Korean firms have been growing so rapidly that the controlling 
shareholder-managers could not keep up with the speed of their firms’ growths. In 
order to avoid the dilution of their shareholding, they built the massive circular 
shareholding structures and inter-locking directorships. They control practically 
one business entity with very little direct investment. Ironically, the ban on dual-
class commons has made the corporate structure of Korean conglomerates less 
transparent.  
                                                 
34 See Alice Schroeder, The Snowball: Warren Buffett and the Business of Life (2009). 
35 See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 713 (2003); Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO 
Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 Journal of Law, Economics, 
and Organization 83 (2001); Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and 
Governance, 65 Stanford Law Review 1325, 1332 – 1336 (2013) (discussing the staggered board). 
36 Hwa-Jin Kim, The Case for Market for Corporate Control in Korea, 8 Journal of 
Korean Law 227, 273 (2008). 
37 See Lucian Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, A Threat to Dual-Class Shares, Financial Times, 
May 31, 2002. But see Ronald Masulis et al., Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64 
Journal of Finance (2009) (finding evidence supporting the hypothesis that managers with greater 
control rights in excess of cash-flow rights are more likely to pursue private benefits at the 
expense of outside shareholders). 
38 Article 369, Paragraph 1 of the KCC. For the rule, see generally Sanford Grossman & 
Oliver Hart, One Share – One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control, 20 Journal of Financial 
Economics 175 (1988); Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate 
Control, 94 Journal of Political Economy 461 (1986); Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, 
Encumbered Shares, 2005 University of Illinois Law Review 775. See also Bernard Black & 
Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harvard Law Review 1911, 
1945 - 1946 (1996) (finding that the one share one vote regime has value). 
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Like it or not, Samsung Group’s future may determine at least the near 
future of the Korean economy. Together with Hyundai Motor Company Group, 
Samsung is the only Korean business organization that remains competitive in the 
ever challenging global markets. If one does not wish Samsung’s failure due to its 
corporate governance issues, and given that Samsung itself cannot solve the 
problems they have satisfactorily, legislative measures will become inevitable to 
the extent that they do not violate the constitution and fundamental principle of 
economic justice. Introduction of the dual-class commons into the KCC may well 
contribute to the solution under the condition that Samsung follows suit of 
Wallenberg in terms of corporate citizenship.  
To be sure, it is beyond the scope of this Essay to figure out how 
Samsung may use the dual-class commons in its restructuring, if introduced. It 
may use methods such as conventional coercive exchange offers39 and adding 
new classes. 40  Numerous factors shall be taken into account in such a 
restructuring and unforeseen barriers may also come up with any plan. However, 
it is certain that Samsung may enjoy more flexibility benefiting the new legal 
environment. Perhaps, the holding structure - as discussed below - with a dual-
class regime comparable to Investor in the Wallenberg Sphere may provide 
Samsung with a good example. 
IV.  INDUSTRY AND FINANCE 
The Wallenberg Sphere structured the group into two segments, i.e., 
financial group and non-financial operational group. The two groups are 
controlled by Investor, but managed independently. On the finance side, now 
almost 160 year old bank Enskilda Banken (SEB) is in charge. The Wallenberg 
established Investor for SEB’s holdings some one hundred years ago, when the 
law restricted bank ownership of shares in industrial firms. 
A.    The Issue 
As mentioned above, the typical Korean conglomerate structure, 
including that of Samsung, is characterized by cross as well as circular 
shareholdings amongst affiliated companies. Many of them are private companies 
about which not much information is available to the outside. These firms conduct 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Richard S. Ruback, Coercive Dual-Class Exchange Offers, 20 Journal of 
Financial Economics 153 (1988). 
40 See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, New Share Class Gives Google Founders Tighter 
Control, DealBook, April 13, 2012. 
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significant volumes of related party transactions.41 However, what if the related 
party transactions were to take place involving financial institutions? 
Ownership in Korean commercial banks is highly dispersed. Major banks 
are owned by foreign investors with no controlling interest. Under the Banking 
Act, there is a ten percent basic ceiling on bank ownership by a single 
shareholder.42 It is understood that the ceiling was introduced to effectively bar 
the Chaebols’, in particular Samsung’s, ownership in commercial banks. The only 
issue is that the government exercises a huge influence on the corporate 
governance of banks.43 On the other hand, non-banking financial institutions in 
Korea are members of big corporate groups, the Chaebols. The ownership in such 
financial institutions, securities firms, insurance companies, and savings banks, 
etc., is concentrated. They are under the control of controlling shareholder-
managers or affiliated firms which again are controlled by families or individuals. 
The trouble is that the non-banking financial institutions have other important 
stakeholders besides managers, employees and shareholders, i.e., customers and 
taxpayers. The deposit insurance program also applies to the institutions. Moral 
hazard and conflict of interests as exemplified by recent scandals44 should be 
addressed through proper corporate governance arrangements and financial 
regulations. 
The Korean government and law makers have been struggling with the 
issue of ‘separation of industry and finance.’ The core of the discussion is if the 
                                                 
41 See generally Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Related Party Transactions, in: The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law 101 (2004). 
42 Article 15, Paragraph 1 of the Banking Act. 
43 Hwa-Jin Kim, Taking International Soft Law Seriously: Its Implications for Global 
Convergence in Corporate Governance, 1 Journal of Korean Law 1 (2001); Hwa-Jin Kim, Living 
with the IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Governance and Regulation of Financial Institutions 
in Korea, 17 Berkeley Journal of International Law 61 (1999). 
44 The savings banks scandal in 2011 was a reincarnation of the savings and loans scandals 
in the United States in 1990s. The controlling shareholder-managers of the troubled savings banks 
simply stole money from their banks due to the lack of stringent supervision. Briberies were also 
involved in some cases. Reform efforts have largely been unsuccessful due to lobbies to the 
lawmakers. But, most savings banks were not members of big corporate groups. Recent scandals 
involve member firms of big corporate groups. One such example is Tongyang Group, which 
failed in 2013. It turned out that Tongyang Securities sold corporate bonds issued by ailing 
affiliates to its customers assuring that the issuers were sound. Many customers were attracted by 
an unusually high interest rate, so they were aware of the potential risks, but apparently took the 
risk believing in ‘too big to fail.’ See Tongyang Investigation Widens, Korea JoongAng Daily, Oct. 
8, 2013. Hyosung Group currently is under criminal investigation, but it appears that they used the 
group’s member capital company like a controlling shareholder family’s private cash register. See 
Prosecution Has Something to Prove, Korea JoongAng Daily, Oct. 15, 2013. 
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law should ban industrial firms’ control over financial firms, i.e., whether Korea 
should ban or restrict ownership in non-banking financial institutions by 
operational companies in corporate groups which are controlled by families. The 
concern here is that industrial firms may abuse financial firms, and their investors 
and customers, for the benefit of their shareholders, including the controlling 
shareholder and his or her family members. Again, Samsung is in the middle of 
the controversy because Samsung Group comprises of financial and non-financial 
operational firms under the ultimate control of a family.  
B.    Pros and Cons 
Opinions favoring the separation are based on mistrust in the financial 
supervisory system. As a matter of fact, the savings bank scandal and the recent 
failure of some non-banking financial institutions support the validity of the claim 
for separation. Ex post regulation cannot be trusted. But, the core of the pro-
separation arguments is the conflicts of interest. Families in control of the group 
and/or operational member firms of the group may harm the financial firm 
through tunneling and/or unfairly favoring member firms within the group, its 
customers and eventually taxpayers along with systemic risk. Also, a separation 
may facilitate fair competition between corporate groups with and without 
financial firms. 
Opinions against the separation, on the other hand, emphasize that no 
country regulates ex ante the new entry into the non-banking industry. Prudential 
rules and tight financial supervision will ensure the soundness of the financial 
institution. And, as far as economic rational is concerned, a similar argument 
favoring the reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 applies here, i.e., 
separation blocks the creation of economies of scale and scope and prevents 
conglomerates from enjoying the financial synergy with stable cash flow. As a 
result it may have adverse impact on the international competitiveness of the local 
financial institutions and consumer benefits.45 The argument also points out that 
the Korean banks ended up being owned by foreign investors due to the ban on 
ownership of Chaebols in commercial banks. The same thing can happen to the 
non-banking financial institutions if more structural regulation is added. 
Regarding the possibility that operational firms may abuse financial firms, they 
                                                 
45 For the discussion, see Hwa-Jin Kim, A Global Structural Regulation of Financial 
Institutions?, 52-4 Seoul Law Journal 169, 180 - 185 (2011); Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker 
Rule and Evolving Financial Markets, 1 Harvard Business Law Review 39 (2011); Eugene A. 
Ludwig, Assessment of Dodd–Frank Financial Regulatory Reform: Strengths, Challenges and 
Opportunities for a Stronger Regulatory System, 29 Yale Journal on Regulation 181, 194 (2012); 
Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure is an Option: An Ersatz–Antitrust Approach 
to Financial Regulation, 120 Yale Law Journal 1368, 1409–1410 (2011). 
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emphasize that the reality usually works the other way around. Operational firms 
within a group support financial firms through providing business opportunities 
arising from the operational firms.46 
The Korean legislature is currently discussing the periodic review on 
controlling shareholders’ personal records. If proven that the controlling 
shareholder or his/her relatives did commit crime or wrongdoing, the controlling 
shareholder shall lose control over the firm through voting right restriction or 
administrative order to dispose of the shares in the firm in the stock market. 
Besides the question of whether such a drastic measure would survive the 
constitutional law challenge, the financial services industry strongly opposes the 
legislative move arguing that the corporate governance of non-financial 
institutions can be determined by factors that lie beyond the scope of practical 
control of controlling shareholders. If adopted, the new rule can in fact be easily 
abused by competitors and even unfriendly or hostile family members or relatives. 
Furthermore, in a situation where the controlling shareholder is another company, 
the corporate governance of certain financial institutions will end up being 
changed by acts of another company’s employees.  
C.     Holding Structure Solution 
The compromising idea in discussion is lifting the ban on general holding 
company’s ownership in financial institutions. Under the current Anti-monopoly 
and Fair Trade Act, a general holding company may not control financial firms 
while financial holding companies are allowed to do it. 47 As an operating 
subsidiary cannot control financial subsidiaries in a holding structure the 
separation of industry and finance can practically be achieved. In this scenario the 
whole Samsung Group transforms itself into a holding structure following the 
example of LG Group and SK Group, among others, and can keep Samsung Life 
and other nine financial entities within the group. 
                                                 
46 This is actually perceived to be the bigger problem in Korea. Financial member firms 
rely too heavily upon businesses supplied by non-financial firms so that their identity and 
competitiveness as financial institutions can be compromised. It also has negative impacts on 
those firms’ relationship with general consumers. The Korean government has recently issued 
guiding rules for related-party transactions involving financial institutions. 
47 The law did ban the establishment of a holding company whose primary purpose was to 
control the management of a domestic company through equity ownership. The policy was 
dropped in 1999 to help big corporate groups ease the restructuring and improvement of corporate 
governance. For the regulation of financial holding companies (in the U.S.), see Howell E. Jackson, 
The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 107 Harvard Law Review 507 
(1994). 
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Another idea is the mezzanine (financial) holding company. According to 
this, general holding companies shall be allowed to control mezzanine holding 
companies that may own financial institutions. Mezzanine holding companies will 
become subject to strengthened financial supervision. This scenario offers a less 
expensive way for Samsung to deal with the issue because it does not require the 
restructuring of the entire group. In any case, the dual-class commons regime as in 
the Investor and SEB relationship in the Wallenberg Sphere would be the practical 
solution especially because it is likely that the Korean government would allow 
the dual-class regime only to private companies, if at all.48 
D.  The Perils of Over-Regulation 
It is a very common phenomenon throughout history that politicians and 
government officials supported by scholars and other experts try to change or 
reform the existing system whenever a scandal takes place. Sometimes it comes 
with significant regulatory costs. One of the most recent examples is arguably the 
U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,49 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 may 
become another example.50 On the one hand, it is a constructive approach. Things 
must be fixed if they are broken. On the other hand, they easily forget that 
scandals always involve illegal and criminal acts of those people who are 
responsible for damages to investors, shareholders, and the economy. It is true that 
Korean firms may take advantage of the financial affilates in bad times. However, 
policy should not be formulated on a worst case and/or isolated scenario. It is like 
unfairly punishing honest firms for acts committed by the bad guys. It may also 
invite opportunistic behavior and corruptive practices in bureaucracy out of the 
labyrinth of regulatory and supervisory details that ultimately create further 
reform needs. 
It has been discussed in the parliament that Samsung Life’s voting rights 
in Samsung Electronics should be restricted through amending the Anti-monopoly 
and Fair Trade Act. How the idea survives the constitutional law challenge is not 
                                                 
48 See the draft article by the Korean Ministry of Justice’s expert group in Kim, supra note 
36 at 274. 
49 For critical assessments, see Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a 
Future?, 26 Yale Journal on Regulation 229 (2009); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale Law Journal 1521 (2005); William J. 
Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of “Going Private,”55 Emory 
Law Journal 141 (2006). But, see Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-
Oxley, 105 Michigan Law Review 1817 (2007). 
50 See, e.g., Diane Katz, Dodd-Frank at Year Three: Onerous and Costly, Heritage Issue 
Brief No. 3993, July 19, 2013; Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker, Dodd-Frank Regulators, Cost-
Benefit Analysis, and Agency Capture, 66 Stanford Law Review Online (2013). 
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an issue for politicians. The Constitutional Court of Korea has become the most 
active constitutional law court in the world reviewing and overturning 
unconstitutional laws passed by the Korean parliament. When Samsung Life in 
fact gets separated from the Samsung Group structure, the family control over the 
group may become weak. There is no way for the family to maintain effective 
control over Samsung Electronics, the world’s thirteenth largest firm, without the 
‘assistance’ of Samsung Life. This puts Samsung in the awkward position that it 
seems to oppose or resist the government policy. As a result, the whole discussion 
on the separation of industry and finance has somehow become a Samsung issue 
which is misleading and unfortunate. The lawmakers seem to try to avoid such an 
impression, but it is obvious simply because the Samsung issue stands out in any 
discussion. 
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As Gilson observed, “the presence of family ownership.. facilitates the 
development and maintenance of the reputation necessary for a corporation’s 
commercial success” in a bad commercial law environment.51 The best example 
is the Wallenberg Sphere in Sweden, a Scandinavian legal system jurisdiction.52 
The family business has successfully survived five generations. The same history 
of success may repeat in Korea. The first step would be to remove widespread 
biases against family-controlled corporate groups with concentrated ownership by 
accepting the proposition that they may be efficient as well. 
This Essay examined the controversial corporate governance issues of 
Samsung Group in comparison with those of the Wallenberg Sphere. The core 
difference between the structure and problems arising therefrom is the use of the 
dual-class commons in Wallenberg. Korean law does not allow the dual-class 
commons, so Samsung relies heavily upon circular shareholding through affiliated 
firms. This Essay concludes that the introduction of the dual-class commons in the 
KCC would ease the pain in difficult corporate governance problems Samsung 
and other Korean firms face should the Wallenberg model be a legitimate one for 
the Korean economy and society. This Essay also emphasizes that such a change 
                                                 
51 See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: 
Anchoring Relational Exchange, 60 Stanford Law Review 633, 636 (2007).  
52 For discussions on the family-controlled U.S. firms, see Danny Miller et al., Are Family 
Firms Really Superior Performers?, 13 Journal of Corporate Finance 829 (2007) (“Although 
international evidence suggests that families may be unhelpful to firm performance, recent 
analyses of U.S. public companies indicate that family firms outperform.”) See also, Belen 
Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How do Family Ownership, Control and Management Affect Firm 
Value?, 80 Journal of Financial Economics 385 (2006). 
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may be legitimate if and only if Korean firms commit socially responsible 
corporate citizenship. 
Finally, the policy issue in Korea now is whether stronger regulation on 
governance of corporate groups with non-banking financial institutions is in order. 
Samsung is in the middle of the controversy. Special legislative initiatives have 
also been taken to address the issue. This Essay briefly explained and analyzed 
the recent developments in corporate governance of non-banking financial 
institutions in Korea and suggested that further regulation would not be efficient 
and rather produce bureaucracy and corruptive practices. If Samsung did not 
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